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AT THE BEHEST OF THE UNITED

STATES GOVERNMENT DOES NOT DEFEAT A COURT'S JURISDICTION DESPITE AN EXTRADITION TREATY BETWEEN THE Two NA-

TIONS-United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112

S. Ct. 2188

(1992).
Extradition' is the rendering of an alleged criminal by one
nation to another for trial or punishment.2 The procedures for
extradition are commonly outlined in an extradition treaty between the two nations. 3 Although it originally refrained from entering into such treaties, the United States currently employs
4
extradition treaties with over one hundred countries.
I Extradition is the "surrender by one state or country to another of an individual accused or convicted of an offence outside its own territory, and within the
territorial jurisdiction of the other, which, being competent to try and punish him,
demands the surrender." Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289 (1902). See also
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 585 (6th ed. 1990) (citing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 and 18
U.S.C.A. § 3181 in defining extradition in language virtually identical to that of the
Terlinden Court).
2 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Unlawful Seizures and IrregularRendition Devices as Alternatives to Extradition, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 25, 25 (1973) (explaining that the
reasoning behind extradition is that "all states have an obligation to cooperate in
the suppression of criminality"); MAJORIE WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 727 (1968) (stating that extradition covers both those charged with a crime
and those already convicted and escaped).
Extradition treaties have existed since ancient times and the first recorded
treaty was between the Egyptian Pharaoh, Ramses II, and the Hittite King, Hattusili
III, in 1280 B.C. Christopher J. Morvillo, Note, Individual Rights and the Doctrine of
Speciality: The Deteriorationof United States v. Rauscher, 14 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 987,
989-90 (1990-91). Although treaties through the Middle Ages were designed to
return political enemies, extradition treaties began to include ordinary crimes. Id.
at 990-91. Today, many extradition treaties include exceptions for political offenses, focusing instead on common crimes. Id. at 991-92.
The Supreme Court has ruled that a person may not be extradited from the
United States absent a treaty. Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S.
5, 9 (1936). The Supreme Court reasoned:
There is no executive discretion to surrender [a requested individual]
to a foreign government, unless that discretion is granted by law. It
necessarily follows that as the legal authority does not exist save as it
is given by act of Congress or by the terms of a treaty, it is not enough
that the statute or treaty does not deny the power to surrender. It
must be found that statute or treaty confers the power.
Id.
3 Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, CriminalJurisdictionof a State Over Fugitives Broughtfrom
a Foreign Country by Force or by Fraud: A Comparative Study, 32 IND. LJ. 427, 427-28
(1957).
4 Abraham Abramovsky, ExtraterritorialAbductions: America's "Catch and Snatch"
Policy Run Amok, 31 VA.J. INT'L L. 151, 154 (1991). The United States was originally disinclined to form extradition treaties because it did not want to discourage
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Nations have sometimes disregarded extradition treaties,
however, choosing instead to abduct a suspect in another sovereign's territory and prosecute him in their own courts.5 The
United States recently undertook such an action when it kidnapped a Mexican doctor despite an extradition treaty with Mexico. 6 Although the doctor argued that the court lacked
jurisdiction because his seizure violated the extradition treaty,
the Supreme Court held that the treaty did not prohibit either
country from kidnapping the other country's citizens.7
On February 7, 1985, agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar, a
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent, was kidnapped
outside of the American Consulate in Guadalajara, Mexico.' A
month later, Camarena's mutilated corpse was found sixty miles
outside of Guadalajara. 9 In December of 1989, the United States
immigration to the United States and wanted to provide a safe haven for refugees.
Id.
5 See id. at 155 ("[Tlhe Reagan and Bush administrations have consistently resorted to extralegal methods of acquiring jurisdiction over foreign suspects, indicating that the United States remains skeptical as to the utility of the extradition
process."). See also Bassiouni, supra note 2, at 26 (explaining that kidnapping is one
of the rendition methods used by governments to bring an individual before a
court).
The Office of Legal Counsel of the Justice Department has issued two different
opinions on the issue of the legality of abducting foreign citizens outside of the
United States. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad. The Constitution
and InternationalLaw, Continued, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 444, 481-82, 484 (1990). The first
of these opinions, issued in 1980, required that United States agents receive permission from an asylum nation to capture a person within its territory. Id. at 483.
The fact pattern presented to the Attorney General's office involved the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) kidnapping a person from a nation which later protested. Id. at 481-82. The opinion held:
[T]he reasonableness of the operation is questionable if it violates international or United States law .... Judges in abduction cases have expressed concern that such extraordinary apprehensions denigrate the
rule of law in the name of upholding it. We think that concern, when
coupled with a U.S. or international law violation, may well lead
courts to conclude that the activity lies beyond the jurisdiction of the
FBI.
Id. at 482 (citation omitted). This opinion was withdrawn in June of 1989, and a
new ruling, which held that the abduction of criminals in other countries was not
illegal under United States law, was issued. Id. at 484-85. This opinion was not
disclosed to the public, but news of its existence sparked a congressional hearing
on the issue. Id. at 484.
6 United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 601-02 (C.D.Cal. 1990),
aff'd sub nom., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991),
rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
7 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2193, 2195, 2197 (1992).
8 Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 601-02.
9 Id. at 602. The Mexican pilot who had assisted Camarena in finding mari-
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government began negotiations with Mexico for the extradition"
of Doctor Humberto Alvarez-Machain, who was allegedly involved in Camarena's torture and murder." After two failed negotiation attempts with Mexican officials,' 2 the United States
executed a plot to bring Dr. Alvarez-Machain to the United States
3
via forcible abduction.'
On April 2, 1990, at the United States' behest, five armed
Mexicans entered Dr. Alvarez-Machain's medical offices in Guadalajara, Mexico, and forced him to accompany them on a flight
to El Paso, Texas, where DEA Agents took him into custody.' 4
Soon thereafter, the Government of Mexico filed several protests
juana plantations was also found murdered. Id. Over twenty-two persons were indicted for involvement in agent Camarena's abduction and murder. Id.
10 Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, United States-United Mexican States, 31
U.S.T. 5059.
Mexican officials wanted to informally render Dr. Alvarez-Machain to United
States officials, fearing that public knowledge of his extradition would upset Mexican citizens. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 602. Informal rendition involves an
agreement between an asylum nation and a requesting nation to forgo the procedures outlined in an extradition treaty. Bassiouni, supra note 2, at 33. Informal
rendition has been distinguished from abduction, which is characterized by "an absence of consultation with any responsible representatives of the asylum country's
government." Abramovsky, supra note 4. at 155-56.
11 Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 602. Dr. Alvarez-Machain had allegedly used
his skills as a physician to keep Camarena alive so that he could be further tortured
and interrogated by drug barons. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct.
2188, 2190 (1992). Dr. Alvarez-Machain was charged with "conspiracy to commit
acts in furtherance of racketeering activity (in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1959);
committing violent acts in furtherance of racketeering activity (in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1959(a)(2)); conspiracy to kidnap a federal agent (in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1201(a)(5), 1201(c)); kidnap of a federal agent (in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1201(a)(5)); and felony murder of a federal agent (in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1111(a), 1114)." Id. at 2190 n.l. (citation omitted).
12 Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 602-03. The DEA had been contacted by the
Mexican Federal Judicial Police (MFJP), which offered to exchange Dr. AlvarezMachain for a Mexican fugitive living in the United States. Id. at 602. The exchange
was agreed to, but then the MFJP requested $50,000 to cover the costs of transporting Dr. Alvarez-Machain to the United States. Id. The DEA refused to pay the
money in advance, and Dr. Alvarez-Machain was not delivered as scheduled. Id.
The MFJP once again attempted to set up an exchange, but the DEA, which initially
agreed to meet to discuss the matter, ultimately refused. Id. This refusal was purportedly because of tensions between the United States and Mexico sparked by an
NBC mini-series about the Camarena murder. Id. at 602-03.
13 Id. at 603. Mexican contacts of the DEA told the DEA that they could abduct
Dr. Alvarez-Machain and deliver him to United States officials. Id.; Alvarez-Machain,
112 S. Ct. at 2190 & n.2. The DEA promised its contacts in Mexico $50,000 plus
expenses for Dr. Alvarez-Machain's delivery to the United States. Caro-Quintero,
745 F. Supp. at 603.
14 Id. Dr. Alvarez-Machain alleged that while he was held captive in Mexico, his
abductors hit him, shocked him and gave him an injection that made him feel
" 'light-headed and dizzy.' " Id. Dr. Alvarez-Machain also alleged certain facts that

1993]

NOTE

1131

with the5 United States and demanded Dr. Alvarez-Machain's
release. '

Dr. Alvarez-Machain was indicted in the United States District Court for the Central District of California and moved to
dismiss the indictment. 16 Dr. Alvarez-Machain argued that the
court lacked personal jurisdiction because he had been abducted
by the United States government in violation of the MexicanAmerican extradition treaty. 7 The district court granted the motion, interpreting the extradition treaty as impliedly prohibiting
one nation from violating the territorial integrity of another.'"
The court found that the United States' abduction of Dr. AlvarezMachain in Mexican territory violated this implied prohibition
and ordered his repatriation to Mexico.' 9
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's decision, 2° based upon its prior holding that a kidnapping
sponsored by the United States, within Mexico, against Mexican
protest, was a violation of the extradition treaty. 2 1 The Supreme
indicated United States involvement in the actual kidnapping in Mexico, but a DEA
agent testified that no agents took part in the kidnapping. Id.
15 Id. at 604. On April 18, 1990, Mexico requested an official report on the part
the United States played in Dr. Alvarez-Machain's kidnapping. Id. On May 16,
1990, and July 19, 1990, Mexico sent notes of protest from its embassy to the State
Department. Id. In the last note it requested the arrest and extradition of those
involved in Dr. Alvarez-Machain's kidnapping. Id. The United States has not only
refused to extradite his kidnappers, but has provided them with a reward of
$20,000, paid $6,000 a week for their living expenses, and brought their families to
the United States. Id. at 603-04.
16 Id. at 601.
'7 Id.
18 Id. at 610.
19 Id. at 614. The district court rejected Dr. Alvarez-Machain's argument that
his abduction constituted a violation of due process. Id. at 604-05 (citations omitted). The court noted that, under the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, how a defendant came
before a court was irrelevant to jursidiction. Id. at 604-05. See infra notes 25-38
and accompanying text regarding the development of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine.
Although recognizing the Toscanino "outrageous government conduct" exception
to Ker-Frisbie, the court ruled that Dr. Alvarez-Machain's allegations of torture did
not fall within the exception. Id. at 605-06. See infra notes 39-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of Toscanino. Ultimately, the court chose not to use its
supervisory powers to dismiss Dr. Alvarez-Machain's indictment. Id. at 615. The
supervisory power, the court explained, was a doctrine allowing a court to dismiss a
case to avoid a violation ofjudicial integrity or apparent approval of illegal conduct.
Id.
20 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S.
Ct. 2188 (1992).
21 Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d at 1466-67 (citing United States v: Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991)). The defendant in Verdugo-Urquidez was also
allegedly involved in Camarena's torture and murder. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at
1343. Like Dr. Alvarez-Machain, he was abducted and brought to the United States
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Court granted certiorari 2 2 and reversed, holding that the DEA's
kidnapping of Dr. Alvarez-Machain did not violate the extradition treaty.2 3 The Court declared that the treaty contained no
prohibition, either explicit or implicit, against either country abducting the other's citizens.2 4
The Supreme Court's decision in Alvarez was based largely
upon that Court's decision more than one hundred years ago in
Ker v. Illinois.25 The Ker Court held that a defendant may be tried
by a court irrespective of the manner in which he came before
it. 2 6 In Ker, the United States had intended to use an extradition
treaty to gain jurisdiction over a United States citizen hiding in
Peru. 2 ' The agent sent to Peru to request the citizen's extradition disregarded extradition procedure. 28 The agent kidnapped
to face trial. Id. The Verdugo-Urquidez court narrowly interpreted Ker v. Illinois, 119
U.S. 436 (1886), as allowing the trial of a defendant kidnapped privately, but not a
kidnapping authorized by the government. Id. at 1345-46. The Verdugo-Urquidez
court also noted that Mexico had strongly protested the defendant's kidnapping,
whereas Peru did not protest Ker's. Id. at 1346. The court remanded the case with
instructions to repatriate the defendant upon a finding that the United States had
been involved in his kidnapping. Id. at 1359.
22 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.Ct. 857 (1992).
23 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.Ct. 2188, 2197 (1992).
24 Id.at 2193, 2195.
25 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
26 Id. at 440, 444. The Ker decision was reaffirmed in Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S.
519, 522 (1952). See infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text. The rule derived
from the two decisions has come to be known as the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. See, e.g.,
United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 604 (C.D.Cal. 1990) (referring
to the doctrine as "Ker-Frisbie"). The Ker-Frisbiedoctrine is also known by its Latin
name, "mala captus bene detentus," which is translated as "bad capture, good detention." Kirk J. Henderson, Note, Fighting the War on Drugs in the "New World Order":
The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine as a Product of Its Time, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 535, 547
(1991).
27 Ker, 119 U.S. at 439 (citing Peruvian-American Extradition Treaty, Sept. 12,
1870, 18 Stat. 719).
28 Id. at 438. In a famous and influential article, Professor Charles Fairman
shared his research as to why the agent ignored the extradition procedures.
Charles Fairman, Ker v. Illinois Revisited, 47 AM.J. INT'L L. 678, 685 (1953). Quoting the Attorney General of Illinois, Fairman reported that when the United States
agent arrived in Peru with the proper papers, ready to request Ker's extradition
from the Peruvian government,
a state of things existed in Peru which rendered the treaty between the
United States and that government inoperative. There was no Peru.
The government had a nominal existence at Ariquipa, back in the
mountains, eighty-five miles from Lima, but General Lynch, of the
Chilean forces, was in military occupation of the capital. Pinkerton's
man had no passport to go through the lines to present our demand
at the mountain camp of the Peruvian government, but did what was
perhaps the next best thing, applied to General Lynch.
Id.at 685 (citation omitted). From this passage, and other evidence, Fairman con-
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the alleged felon and transported him to the United States where
29
he was brought to trial.

The Ker Court first rejected the defendant's claim that the
irregular method of gaining his presence violated due process. 30
Rather, the Court held, due process was satisfied by the use of a
grand jury and a fair trial. 3' Additionally, the Court stressed that
the United States neither invoked the treaty with Peru nor authorized the kidnapping; therefore the Court ruled that there was
no treaty violation.32 Because defendant Ker did not come to the
United States pursuant to the treaty, the Court decided, he was
not "clothed with [the] rights" that the treaty granted.3 3
cluded that "there was no invasion of Peruvian sovereignty or other breach of international law." Id. at 686. See also John G. Kester, Some Myths of United States
Extradition Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 1441, 1451 (1988) (distinguishing Ker from an ordinary extradition case because the courts and civil government of Peru were not
operating).
29 Ker, 119 U.S. at 438. Ker was charged with larceny and embezzlement. Id. at
437.
30 Id. at 440.
31 Id. The Court also rejected the defendant's claim that he had a right to asylum in Peru, citing the fact that Peru could have delivered Ker up to the United
States government. Id. at 442. The Court saw no language in the treaty that gave
those in Peru a right to asylum and suggested that an agreement of that kind would
be absurd. Id. In other words, the Ker majority decided that the Peruvian-American Treaty had limited Ker's right to asylum in Peru and did not give him any
additional rights. Id.
32 Id. at 443. The Court stated that the treaty "was not called into operation,
was not relied upon, was not made the pretext of arrest, and the facts show that it
was a clear case of kidnapping within the dominions of Peru, without any pretence
of authority under the treaty or from the government of the United States." Id.
33 Id. The Ker Court reminded that Ker was not without a remedy. Id. at 444.
The Court asserted that Ker's kidnappers could be extradited for trial in Peru and
that Ker could bring false imprisonment and trespass actions against them. Id.
Recent scholarship has questioned the validity of the Ker holding. See, e.g.,
Abramovsky, supra note 4, at 156 (asserting that although "Ker has been cited in
almost every case of extraordinary apprehension, and has been consistently followed, Ker was a judicial fluke and continued reliance upon it for our national policy is sheer folly"); Edwin D. Dickinson, Jurisdiction Following Seizure or Arrest in
Violation of InternationalLaw, 28 AM. J. INT'L L. 231, 238 (1934) (stating that the
result in Ker was "unsatisfactory in both its procedural and its substantive aspects,"
and questioning whether the presentation of the case to the Supreme Court led to
the poor result); Kester, supra note 28, at 1449 (criticizing the holding of Ker as
"questionable and dated"); Clare E. Lewis, Unlawful Arrest: A Bar to theJurisdictionof
the Court, or Mala Captus Bene Dententus? Sidney Jaffe: A Case in Point, 28 CRIM. L.Q.
341, 348 (1985-86) ("The critical distinction made by the common court in Ker and
Rauscher appears to be that for American Government officials to ignore a valid
extradition treaty in force and kidnap a fugitive on the territory of the foreign treaty
signator does not involve a breach of the treaty. Only if the treaty is utilized, and a
condition of it ignored, is there a breach of the treaty giving rise to a remedy. This
distinction is not capable of rational justification and smacks of sophistry.");
Jonathan Gentin, Comment, Government-Sponsored Abduction of Foreign Criminals
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The Supreme Court reaffirmed the Ker decision in Frisbie v.
Collins.3 4 In Frisbie, an alleged murderer fled from Michigan to
Chicago, where Michigan police captured him and brought him
to trial in Michigan. 35 The Frisbie Court fervently rejected the defendant's argument that the enactment of a federal kidnapping
statute 36 had changed the Ker holding. 37 The Court denied any
judicial departure from the rule announced in Ker v. Illinois,
which stated that a court's ability to try a defendant was not affected by the individual's forcible abduction.3 8
The Second Circuit, however, created an exception to the
Ker-Frisbie doctrine in United States v. Toscanino.3 9 The Toscanino
Abroad: Reflections on United States v. Caro-Quintero and the Inadequacy of the KerFrisbie Doctrine, 40 EMORY L.J. 1227, 1230 (1991) (calling Ker-Frisbie an "anachronism" and "antiquated").
One problem scholars have had with the Ker decision is that, at the time the
messenger arrived in Peru, there was no government to request extradition from,
no government to hand Ker over, and no government to denounce the forcible
abduction and violation of its territorial integrity. Fairman, supra note 28, at 685.
See also supra note 28 for further explanation of the state of the Peruvian government at the time of Ker's abduction.
Another criticism has been that the Ker holding is often overstated. See, e.g.,
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1348 (9th Cir. 1991) ("It is
manifestly untrue that a court may never inquire into how a criminal defendant
came before it."), cert. granted andjudgment vacated by 112 S. Ct. 2986 (1992). Scholars argue that the Ker holding is limited to cases where an alleged criminal is kidnapped by a private citizen and handed over to United States law enforcement
officials; it does not, however, hold that a criminal may be tried when the government has instigated the kidnapping in a foreign country with which the United
States has an extradition treaty. See Gentin, supra, at 1233 ("In essence, the Court
decided that a private kidnapping--one not authorized or sponsored by the statedoes not violate an extradition treaty."); Martin B. Sipple, Note, The Wild, Wild Western Hemisphere: Due Process and Treaty Limitations on the Power of United States Courts to
Try Foreign Nationals Abducted Abroad by Government Agents, 68 WASH. U. L.Q 1047,
1053 (1990) ("Because Ker involved a United States citizen abducted without official authorization, the case leaves open jurisdictional questions arising when the
United States government kidnaps a foreigner from his home country.").
34 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952).
35 Id. at 520. The district court denied Frisbie's request for a writ of habeas
corpus, explaining that the state had the power to try a criminal " 'regardless of
how [his] presence was procured.' " Id. The court of appeals reversed, holding
that the Federal Kidnapping Act had altered the Supreme Court's previous decisions that a state court could try a person taken by force. Id.; Collins v. Frisbie, 189
F.2d 464, 467 (6th Cir. 1951), rev'd, 342 U.S. 519 (1952). The Supreme Court
granted certiorari. Collins v. Frisbie, 342 U.S. 865 (1952).
36 Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1948).
37 Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 522-23.
38 Id. at 522. The Court further opined that there is nothing in the Constitution
to prevent a court from trying a person wrongfully captured. Id.
39 500 F.2d 267, 275 (2d Cir. 1974). See Andrew M. Wolfenson, Note, The U.S.
Courts and the Treatment of Suspects Abducted Abroad Under International Law, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 705, 724-38, 746 (1989-90) (chronicling the rise and fall of the Tos-
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court held that due process was violated if the government abducted a person from another country, tortured him and brought
him before a United States court for adjudication. 40 The circuit
court, after reviewing the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, consulted other
Supreme Court decisions that had expanded constitutional due
process protections. 4 The Toscanino court stated that these cases
stood for the principle that "the government should be denied
canino exception to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine and arguing that Toscanino should be
used to prevent agents from benefitting from unlawful conduct).
40 Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 275-76. Francisco Toscanino, an Italian citizen, was
indicted under drug smuggling charges and brought forcibly from Uruguay to the
United States. Id. at 268-69. Toscanino claimed that the proceedings in the district
court against him were void because he had been brought before the court illegally,
and offered to prove his assertions that he had been brutally tortured and abducted
by agents of the United States, and that the evidence against him had been illegally
obtained. Id. at 269, 271. Toscanino alleged that he was tortured and interrogated
for three weeks. Id. at 269. He further claimed that:
"[His] captors denied him sleep and all forms of nourishment for days
at a time. Nourishment was provided intravenously in a manner precisely equal to an amount necessary to keep him alive. Reminiscent of
the horror stories told by our military men who returned from Korea
and China, Toscanino was forced to walk up and down a hallway for
seven or eight hours at a time. When he could no longer stand he was
kicked and beaten but all in a manner contrived to punish without
scarring. When he would not answer, his fingers were pinched with
metal pliers. Alcohol was flushed into his eyes and nose and other
fluids ...

were forced up his anal passage. Incredibly, these agents of

the United States government attached electrodes to Toscanino's earlobes, toes, and genitals. Jarring jolts of electricity were shot throughout his body, rendering him unconscious for indeterminate periods of
time but again leaving no physical scars."
Id. at 270.
The district court had refused to grant him a hearing, citing to Ker and Frisbie.
Id. at 271. The district court "held that the manner in which Toscanino was
brought into the territory of the United States was immaterial to the court's power
to proceed, provided he was physically present at the time of trial." Id.
41 Id. at 272-75 (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165 (1952); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)).
Mapp held that illegally-seized evidence should be excluded from state court
trials, overturning Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 24 (1949), which had allowed evidence to be admitted which was the product of unreasonable search and seizure.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961).
In Rochin, which involved three state police officers forcing a suspect to have
his stomach pumped against his will, the Court held that such a method of obtaining evidence "shocks the conscience" and violates the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 166, 172-73
(1952).
In Weeks, the Court held that evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure must be returned and that
its use at trial constitutes a prejudicial error. Weeks v. United States, 383, 398
(1914).
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the right to exploit its own illegal conduct ' 42 and opined that
when this principle stood inapposite to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine,
the latter should yield.4 3 The court remanded the case for a
hearing on Toscanino's allegations.4 4 The Second Circuit later
narrowed the outrageous government conduct exception to KerFrisbie.4 5
42 Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 275 (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
488 (1963)).
43 Id. The court ruled that due process required "a court to divest itself ofjurisdiction over the person of a defendant where it has been acquired as the result of
the government's deliberate, unnecessary and unreasonable invasion of the accused's constitutional rights." Id. The Court retreated, however, from this bold
statement by distinguishing Ker and Frisbie based on the fact that neither of the
abductions in those cases were instigated by the United States government. Id. at
277.
The court also ruled that, when Toscanino alleged the United States government had placed wiretaps on his phone in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the
Due Process Clause's prohibition against the illegal gathering of evidence applied
to citizens of other countries within those countries. Id. at 280. The Supreme
Court has since repudiated this position, in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.
494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990).
The Supreme Court in Verdugo-Urquidez rejected the notion that the Fourth
Amendment prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure applied to actions
outside the United States upon non-Americans. Id. at 274-75. Verdugo-Urquidez,
like Dr. Alvarez-Machain, was allegedly involved in the murder of DEA agent Enrique Camarena, as well as drug trafficking. Id. at 262. After Verdugo-Urquidez
was arrested, his property in Mexico was searched without a warrant. Id. Construing the words "the people" in the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court refused
to extend the exclusionary rule to aliens illegally searched outside of the United
States. Id. at 265, 270.
For discussions of the Verdugo-Urquidez decision, see generally Mark A. Marionneaux, Note, International Scope of Fourth Amendment Protections: United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 52 LA. L. REV. 455, 476-77 (1991) (examining the Verdugo-Urquidez decision and questioning whether the Fourth Amendment will now protect
aliens residing in the United States); Mary L. Nicholas, Comment, United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez: Restricting the Borders of the Fourth Amendment, 14 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 267, 294 (1990-91) (discussing Verdugo-Urquidez and criticizing the decision as
"misguided"); Mindy A. Oppenheim, Comment, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez: Hands Across the Border-The Long Reach of United States Agents Abroad, and the
Short Reach of the Fourth Amendment, 17 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 617, 618 (1991) (reviewing the Verdugo-Urquidez decision and bemoaning the erosion of the Fourth
Amendment).
44 Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 281. On remand, the district court followed the Second
Circuit's order to consider Toscanino's claim of abduction and torture. United
States v. Toscanino, 398 F. Supp. 916, 916 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (citing United States v.
Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 281 (2d Cir. 1974)). Because Toscanino failed to allege
that United States officials had participated in his torture and abduction and offered
no evidence that it was directed by such officials, the district court refused to hold
an evidentiary hearing and did not dismiss the indictments against Toscanino on
jurisdictional grounds. Id. at 917.
45 See United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.) (narrowing
the Toscanino exception to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001
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While the Ker-Frisbie doctrine became entrenched in American criminal law, another important principle developed, estab(1975); United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847
(1975).
In Lujan, the court held that an irregularity in the capture of a criminal does
not itself violate due process. Lujan, 510 F.2d at 66. Rather, the court decided, the
conduct must rise to the level of shocking the conscience, as had the alleged facts of
Toscanino. Id. The defendant in Lujan, indicted on drug charges, was allegedly
lured from Argentina to Bolivia by American agents, where he was taken into custody by Bolivian police acting on behalf of the United States. Id. at 63. He was
subsequently placed on a plane bound for the United States and arrested by federal
agents. Id. Unlike Toscanino, however, the defendant in Lujan did not allege torture, but only illegality in his seizure. Id. at 66.
The Lujan court considered an argument that the defendant's capture violated
international law, embodied in the charters of the United Nations and the Organization of American States. Id. at 66. The Court did not find a violation of international law, however, because neither Bolivia or Argentina objected to his
abduction. Id. at 67.
The Second Circuit further narrowed the Toscanino holding in United States v.
Lira, 515 F.2d 68, 71 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975). In Lira, the court
ruled that a criminal must not only prove torture and unlawful abduction to fit into
the Toscanino exception, but must also prove that agents of the United States were
directly involved in the misconduct. Id. at 71. The defendant in Lira alleged that
Chilean police had arrested him at the home of his common-law wife and had
brought him to a police station where he was "blindfolded . . . beaten, strapped
nude to a box spring, tortured with electric shocks, and questioned..." Id. at 69.
Although he alleged that he had heard English spoken and Americans referred to,
he offered no proof that agents of the United States took part in his torture and
there was testimony by a DEA agent that no agents were present at the police station. Id. at 69-70.
The court also rejected Lira's contention that the government was vicariously
responsible for his mistreatment, and that Toscanino should thus apply. Id. at 71.
The court noted that the exclusionary rule under Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961), was intended to "deter police misconduct." Id. The court reasoned that
there was no point in releasing Lira, because such a release would not deter Chilean police from engaging in conduct such as torture. Id. at 71.
The Toscanino exception has been recognized in several courts of appeals.
Wolfenson, supra note 39, at 726-33. See, e.g., United States v. Pelaez, 930 F.2d 520,
525 (6th Cir. 1991) (distinguishing a defendant's allegations of mistreatment from
the facts alleged in Toscanino); United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1092-93 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) (recognizing Toscanino as a limited exception to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine
but deciding it did not apply to the facts of Yunis); Davis v. Muellar, 643 F.2d 521,
527 (8th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 892 (1981); United States v. Cordero,
668 F.2d 32, 37 (1st Cir. 1981) (same); United States v. Fielding, 645 F.2d 719,
723-24 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating that because the defendant did not allege the involvement of United States agents Toscanino did not apply).
Other circuits, however, have rejected the exception. Wolfenson, supra note 39,
at 734-38. See, e.g, Matta-Ballesteras v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 260-61 (7th Cir.)
(noting Toscanino's "ambiguous constitutional origins," the court rejected the exception even though the defendant had been allegedly abducted and subdued with
a gun), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 209 (1990); United States v. Darby, 744 F.2d 1508,
1531 (1 th Cir. 1984) (questioning Toscanino's validity as the Supreme Court had
continued to reaffirm the Ker-Frisbiedoctrine), cert. denied sub nom. Yamanis v. United
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lishing that a court did not have jurisdiction over a case if the trial
would result in a treaty violation. 46 Ker v. Illinois can be distinguished from this principle because in Ker the Supreme Court
emphasized that the defendant was not protected by the Peru47
vian-American treaty because he was not acquired under it.
Therefore, no treaty violation occurred.48 On the same day that
Ker was decided, however, the Court also held, in United States v.
Rauscher, that when a defendant was acquired through the invocation of a treaty, he could
be tried only for the crimes for which he
49
had been extradited.

In Rauscher, the United States acquired the defendant from
Britain under an extradition treaty for the purposes of trying him
for murder. 50 A court subsequently tried him, however, for cruel
and unusual punishment. 5 Rauscher argued that this action
constituted a treaty violation.52 The Rauscher Court ended a
States, 471 U.S. 1100 (1985); United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975, 986-87 (5th
Cir.) (same), cert. denied sub nom. Parks v. United States, 423 U.S. 825 (1975).
Moreover, the Supreme Court, in dicta, has since reaffirmed the broad KerFrisbierule. See United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474 (1980) (citations omitted)
(stating that a defendant "cannot claim immunity from prosecution simply because
his appearance in court was precipitated by an unlawful arrest. An illegal arrest,
without more, has never been viewed as a bar to subsequent prosecution, nor as a
defense to a valid conviction."); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975) (citations omitted) ("Nor do we retreat from the established rule that illegal arrest or
detention does not void a subsequent conviction."); I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468
U.S. 1032, 1039-40 (1984) (citations omitted) ("The 'body' or identity of a defendant or respondent in a criminal or civil proceeding is never itself suppressible as a
fruit of an unlawful arrest, even if it is conceded that an unlawful arrest, search, or
interrogation occurred."); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485 (1976) (citations
omitted) ("judicial proceedings need not abate when the defendant's person is unconstitutionally seized").
46 See, e.g., Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 121 (1933) (holding that the
government lacked power to seize a boat because a treaty limited such power and
thus the court lacked jurisdiction); Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309, 321 (1907)
(holding that an extradited individual could not be punished for a crime for which
he had not been extradited); United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 424 (1886)
(holding that an extradited individual could not be tried for a crime for which he
had not been extradited).
47 Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 443 (1886). See supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of the facts and holding of Ker.
48 Id.
49 Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 424.
50 Id. at 409.
51 Id. The defendant was a sailor who, after assaulting and killing a subordinate
crew member in violation of United States laws, fled to Great Britain. Id. Britain
rendered him for the charge of murder pursuant to a treaty which provided for
extradition. Id. at 409-10 (citing Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842, 8 Stat. 576).
52 Id.
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53
great controversy over the Anglo-American extradition treaty

by deciding that the extradition treaty precluded the prosecution
of a defendant for any offenses other than those for which the
defendant had explicitly been extradited. 54 The notion that the
state requesting extradition could prosecute an extradited defendant only for crimes specified to a55granting nation has become
known as the doctrine of speciality.
The Rauscher Court began its analysis by listing the seven extraditable offenses included in the treaty, and observed that cruel
and unusual punishment was not among them. 56 The Court
noted that a nation would be unlikely to turn over one of its citizens to another nation if the requesting country did not make
53 Morvillo, supra note 2, at 993-95. During the middle 1800's, the United States
and Great Britain were embroiled in a heated debate over whether a criminal extradited to the United States for a specified crime could be tried for an offense other
than the one for which he had been extradited. Id. The United States refusal to try
a defendant only for the crimes for which he had been extradited caused considerable tension between Britain and the United States, precipitating suspension of extradition between the nations for six months. Id.
54 Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 424.
55 Morvillo, supra note 2, at 987 (explaining that "[t]he doctrine of speciality
embodies the theory in international law that compels the requesting state to prosecute the extradited individual upon only those offenses for which the requested
country granted extradition.").
One scholar has explained the reason behind the doctrine of speciality:
The raison d'etre of this doctrine lies in the well founded apprehension
that the principle whereby a state is not obliged to surrender political
offenders would be of no practical value if States were free to prosecute an extradited fugitive for an act different from that for which his
extradition was granted. For, in principle, it would be quite simple
for a State to demand the extradition of a fugitive for a common crime
and once the accused is within its jurisdiction to prosecute him for a
political offense.
Garcia-Mora, supra note 3, at 439.
56 Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 410-11, 420-21. Article X of the Treaty provided:

It is agreed that the United States and Her Britannic Majesty shall,
upon mutual requisitions by them, or their ministers, officers, or authorities, respectively made, deliver up to justice all persons who, being charged with the crime of murder, or assault with intent to commit
murder, or piracy, or arson, or robbery, or forgery, or the utterance of
forged paper, committed within the jurisdiction of either, shall seek
an asylum, or shall be found, within the territories of the other: provided that this shall only be done upon such evidence of criminality
as, according to the laws of the place where the fugitive or person so
charged shall be found, would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial, if the crime or offence had there been committed.
Id.
The Court went on to consult previous cases, the constitutional basis for treaties, the treaty in question, and recent scholarship arguing that the doctrine of speciality should be implied in extradition treaties. Id. at 412-16.
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assurances that the alleged criminal would only be tried for the
specified crimes.5 7
The Rauscher majority rebuffed the government's assertion
that, once in the country, a criminal brought in by means of an
extradition treaty could be tried for any crime.5 8 Instead, the
Court opined, the treaty was based on a good faith commitment
to follow the procedures outlined in the treaty.5 9 Thus, the
Court decided, a criminal brought to the United States through
the use of a treaty could only be tried for those crimes specified
to the asylum nation at the outset.6" After the guilt or innocence
of the alleged criminal was determined for the originally-specified crime, the Court required that he must be given adequate
time to leave the country before rearrest was permissible.6
A number of years later, the Court implied the doctrine of
57 Id. at 420-21. The Rauscher Court discussed one of the underlying reasons for
the rule of speciality; specifically, that a country does not wish to allow a person
who had sought asylum to be tried for a political offense in another nation. Id. at
420. See also Garcia-Mora, supra note 3, at 439 (warning that it "would be quite
simple for a State to demand the extradition of a fugitive for a common crime and
once the accused is within its jurisdicition to prosecute him for a political
offense.").
58 Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 422. It should be noted that the government argued in
Rauscher with the same reasoning it again relied on in Alvarez-Machain: in the absence of an express restriction in the extradition treaty, the defendant could be
tried for any offense that the government decided to prosecute. Id.; United States
v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2194 (1992). The Rauscher Court rejected this
argument after finding that it directly contravened the treaty's purpose. Rauscher,
119 U.S. at 422-23. The Alvarez-Machain Court, however, embraced this argument.
Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2194.
59 Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 422-23. The Court additionally consulted federal statutes, and claimed the statutes supported its interpretation of the treaty. Id. at 42324. The first of these statutes permitted the Secretary of State to extradite a person
to another country " 'to be tried for the crime of which such person shall be accused.' " Id. (citation omitted). The second statute provided for the protection of
those extradited to the United States " 'until the final conclusion of his trial for the
crimes or offenses specified in the warrant of extradition.' " Id. (citation omitted).
The Rauscher Court's consultation of these statutes later became important in
Alvarez-Machain. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2191. The majority there mentioned
the statutes in an attempt to prove that the Rauscher Court had more solid ground
to stand on when it implied a term into the treaty it was interpreting. Id. The
Alvarez-Machain dissent criticized the majority's reading of the Rauscher Court's reference to the statutes. Id. at 2201 n.18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
60 Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 424.
61 Id. Justice Gray concurred in the result, but would have decided the case
solely by reference to the federal statutes. Id. at 433 (Gray, J., concurring). Chief
Justice Waite dissented, rejecting the Court's ruling that the treaty contained an
implied term of speciality. Id. at 434 (Waite, C.J., dissenting). The dissent accepted the government's argument that the treaty contained no provision protecting an extradited person from prosecution for an offense other than the one for
which he had been extradited. Id.
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speciality into another extradition treaty, holding that punishing
a defendant for crimes for which he had not been extradited
would violate an implied term of the treaty.6 2 In Johnson v.
Browne, pending an appeal for a conviction for crimes he committed as a customs worker, the defendant escaped to Canada. 63
Upon Canada's initial refusal to extradite for fraud, the United
States again applied for his extradition but for a different offense,
for which the defendant had not been tried or convicted. 6 4 Canada granted extradition and surrendered the defendant, Browne,
to the United States. 65 Browne was not, however, tried for the
crime specified in the extradition agreement, but was imprisoned
at Sing Sing Penitentiary under the charge of fraud.6 6
Browne asserted that the United States had violated the extradition treaty and the Supreme Court agreed. 67 The Court
held that, contrary to the government's reading of the treaty, the
treaty language implied that an extradited person could only be
punished for crimes for which he had been extradited. 6 8 The
Court held that, although the punishment of criminals was a high
be "construed
priority, an even higher priority was that treaties
69
faith."
good
highest
the
with
accordance
in
62 Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309, 321 (1907).
63 Id. at 311. Browne had been convicted of conspiring to defraud the United
States government. Id. at 310-11. He was sentenced to two years in prison, and his
conviction had been affirmed by the Second Circuit. Id. at 311. While Browne's
petition for certiorari was pending in the Supreme Court, he fled to Canada. Id.
The United States applied to Canada for his extradition for fraud, a crime listed as
an extraditable offense in the treaty. Id. Although he had also been indicted for
knowingly attempting to bring silks into the country for less than the required duty,
Browne was not convicted of this offense. Id. at 310-11. A Canadian court ruled
that the provision did not allow extradition for conspiracy to defraud the United
States government. Id. at 311-12. Under the Treaty "[flraud by a bailee, banker,
agent, factor, trustee or director or member or officer of any company made criminal by the laws of both countries" was an extraditable offense. Id. at 311 (citation
omitted).
64 Id.

at 312.

65 Id.
66 Id.

67 Id. at 312, 322.
68 Id. at 319-20. The government's argument focused on the fact that although
Article III of the treaty prevented a person extradited under it from being tried for
a crime for which he was not extradited, it did not state that a person could not be
punished for a crime for which he had been extradited. Id. The Court rejected this
argument, looking to the objectives of the treaty, one of which was to make imprisonment for crimes for which a defendant had not been extradited illegal. Id. at 320.
69 Id. at 321. The Court declared as follows:
While the escape of criminals is, of course, to be greatly deprecated, it
is still more important that a treaty of this nature between sovereignties should be construed in accordance with the highest good faith,
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During prohibition, another controversy arose over a treaty
between the United States and Britain requiring a Supreme
Court interpretation of the treaty in Cook v. United States.70 The
treaty in Cook permitted the United States government to board
British ships within an hour's journey from the coast of the
United States to search for alcohol improperly transported. 7 '
The British government argued that the treaty impliedly prevented the boarding of ships at a distance greater than an hour's
travel.7 2 Upon protest that a search and seizure of a British ship
violated the treaty with Britain, the district court dismissed the
case. 7 The court of appeals reversed, however, finding that the
treaty did not alter a pre-existing American law that allowed officers to board at a greater distance. 4
and that it should not be sought by doubtful construction of some of
its provisions to obtain the extradition of a person for one offense and
then punish him for another and different offense.
Id.
70 Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 109, 111 (1933) (citing Convention for
the Prevention of Smuggling of Intoxicating Liquors, Jan. 23, 1924, U.S.-Gr. Brit.,
Art. II, 43 Stat. 1761). The treaty with Britain was entered into as a measure to
prevent prohibition from stymieing trade between the United States and Britain, as
the United States claimed the right to search all boats within its territorial waters.
Id. at 116-17. The treaty allowed British ships to have alcoholic beverages on
board as long as they were sealed. Id. at 117.
71 Id. at 117-18. The compromise reached by the governments in the treaty did
not define a specific territorial zone in which ships could be boarded and searched,
but rather adopted the "hour's distance" language. Id.
72 Id. at 106. The treaty read in Article II:
(1) His Britannic Majesty agrees that he will raise no objection to the
boarding of private vessels under the British flag outside the limits of
territorial waters by the authorities of the United States, its territories
or possessions in order that enquiries may be addressed to those on
board and an examination be made of the ship's papers for the purpose of ascertaining whether the vessel or those on board are endeavoring to import or have imported alcoholic beverages into the United
States ....

(3) The rights conferred by this article shall not be exercised at a
greater distance from the Coast of the United States, its territories or
possessions than can be traversed in one hour by the vessel suspected
of endeavoring to commit the offense.
Id. at 110-11 (quoting Convention for the Prevention of Smuggling of Intoxicating
Liquors, Jan. 23, 1924, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Art. 11, 43 Stat. 1761).
73 Id. at 108.
74 Id. at 108-09. A British boat, the Mazel Toy, had been boarded and searched
four leagues off the coast of Massachusetts. Id. at 107. Although this was a legal
search and seizure under United States law, it was not within the one hour's journey permitted by the treaty with Britain. Id. The Mazel Toy was 11.5 miles off the
United States coast, and could travel at a maximum of 10 miles an hour. Id. The
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.75 After
finding that the treaty prevented seizure by the United States, the
Court rejected the United States government's argument that a
court could exercise jurisdiction despite a treaty violation.76 The
Court ruled that the seizure was improper because the United
States government lacked the power to seize the ship in that area
77
due to self-imposed "territorial limitations of the treaty."
Moreover, the Court emphasized that permitting jurisdiction
over a matter subsequent to an improper seizure would "nullify
78
the purpose and effect of the treaty."

Mazel Toy's only cargo was alcohol, intended to be shuttled into the United States
by other boats. Id.
75 Id. at 109, 122.
76 Id. at 120-21. To interpret the treaty, the Court first looked at its history,
finding that the agreement intended to limit the United States ability to search and
seize vessels. Id. at 118. The Court also noted the Treasury Department's practice
of boarding ships only within the hour's journey. Id. at 119. The Court then rejected the government's contention that a federal statute had modified the treaty.
Id. at 119-20.
77 Id. at 121. The Court concluded:
The objection to the seizure is not that it was wrongful merely because [it was] made by one upon whom the Government had not conferred authority to seize at the place where the seizure was made. The
objection is that the Government itself lacked power to seize, since by
the Treaty it had imposed a territorial limitation upon its authority.
The Treaty fixes the conditions under which a 'vessel may be seized
and taken into a port of the United States, its territories or possessions for adjudication in accordance with' the applicable laws.
Thereby, Great Britain agreed that adjudication may follow a rightful
seizure. Our government, lacking power to seize, lacked power, because of the Treaty, to subject the vessel to our laws.
Id. at 121-22.
78 Id. (citing United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886)). Justices Sutherland and Butler dissented, declaring that the treaty did not curtail the United States
rights but was intended to expand its ability to enforce prohibition. Id. at 122
(Sutherland and Butler, J.J., dissenting).
One scholar highly praised the Cook decision, maintaining that it rested "upon
a firm foundation of sound logic and wise judicial policy. If the original arrest or
seizure is illegal because in violation of treaty, it is logical to conclude that no competence is acquired thereby. Surely the ratification of an illegal act should not
purge it of illegality." Dickinson, supra note 33, at 236. Professor Dickinson reconsidered British and American precedent in light of Cook's holding. Id. at 237. He
concluded:
If the person or thing which is the subject of controversy has been
brought within reach of the court's process by a breach of treaty or
international law, the court should approve no arbitrary or face-saving
distinctions. The court is an arm of the nation and its jurisdiction can
rise no higher, by virtue of process served within the territory, than
the jurisdiction of the nation it represents. If there was no jurisdiction
in the nation to make the original seizure or arrest, there should be no
jurisdiction in the court subject to the nation's law. In terms of Amer-
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Although the Supreme Court had never, before the recent
Alvarez decision, considered whether kidnapping by the government would constitute a violation of an extradition treaty, lower
courts have implied that such abductions could amount to such a
violation.79 Rejecting defenses to jurisdiction either because an
asylum nation did not object to the extradition or because private
citizens performed the kidnapping, these courts implied that if
the abductor were the United States and if the nation from which
the citizen was abducted had objected to the abduction, a court
would lack jurisdiction.80
The Eleventh Circuit decision inJaffe v. Smith exemplifies the
presumption that extradition treaties prohibit the United States
from kidnapping in the treaty partner's territory. 8 ' Sidney Jaffe,
indicted for illegal land sales, jumped bail and fled to Canada. 2
Jaffe's failure to appear for trial prompted his bail bonding company to dispatch two bounty hunters, who kidnapped him in Canada and returned him to the United States. 83 Before the court of
ican precedents, this means that the underlying principle of United
States v. Rauscher is correct and that the distinction attempted in Ker
v. Illinois is arbitrary, unsound, and should be repudiated; [and] that
the principle of [Cook] is unimpeachable....
Id. at 244.
79 See, e.g., United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32, 38 (1st Cir. 1981) (citation
omitted) ("[U]nder international law, it is the contracting foreign government, not
the defendant, that would have the right to complain about a violation. The record
here provides no basis for any inference that either Panama or Venezuela objected
to appellants' departure from their territories. To the contrary, it was Panamanian
and Venezuelan authorities who deported them."); United States v. Valot, 625 F.2d
308, 310 (9th Cir. 1980) (where Thai authorities handed over a fugitive to United
States agents without the use of an extradition treaty, no treaty violation occurred):
United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 67 (2d Cir.) ("[T]he failure of
Bolivia and Argentina to object to Lujan's abduction would seem to preclude any
violation of international law which may have occurred."), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001
(1975); United States v. Sobell, 244 F.2d 520, 525 (2d Cir.) (kidnapping of Mexican
in Mexico, despite an extradition treaty, did not violate the treaty, but Mexico did
not object and the kidnappers were not authorized to kidnap by the United States),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 873 (1957).
80 See supra note 79 for a discussion of those cases suggesting that if the United
States government performed the abduction then a United States court would lack
jurisdiction. Notably, such was the factual setting of Dr. Alvarez-Machain's kidnapping. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 601-04 (C.D.Cal. 1990),
aff'dsub nom., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1467 (9th Cir.), rev'd, 112
S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
81 825 F.2d 304 (11th Cir. 1987).
82 Id. at 305. Authorities arrestedJaffe in Florida and charged him with twentyeight counts of illegal land sale practices. Id.
83 Id. Although an attorney for the state twice applied to the Governor of Florida for the extradition ofJaffe, the applications were rejected by the state Attorney
General for reasons of form. Id. After Jaffe was convicted of both the original
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appeals, Jaffe argued that his abduction from Canada violated the
United States' extradition treaty with Canada and thus rendered
his conviction invalid. 84 The court ruled, however, that establishing a treaty violation required a defendant to prove that the
United States was involved in the abduction.85
Against this background of the Ker and Rauscher lines of
cases, the Supreme Court decided United States v. AlvarezMachan,86 holding that the DEA's kidnapping of Dr. AlvarezMachain did not violate the extradition treaty with Mexico, because the treaty neither explicitly nor implicitly prohibited either
country from abducting the other's citizens.8 7 Noting that the
case was one of first impression, the Court examined precedent
regarding both the violation of extradition treaties and forcible
abductions
which
nonetheless
gave courts
personal
jurisdiction.88
crimes and failure to appear at trial, he appealed to the Florida Court of Appeals,
which reversed his illegal land sale convictions but affirmed his conviction for failure to appear at trial. Id. at 305-06. While the appeal was pending, Jaffe filed a
habeas corpus petition with the federal district court on the grounds that Florida
had no jurisdiction to try him because his kidnapping violated the extradition treaty
with Canada. Id. at 306 (citing Treaty of Extradition, Dec. 3, 1971, U.S.-Can., 27
U.S.T. 983).
84 Id.
85 Id. at 307. The court ruled as follows:
Unless a defendant can prove that she or he was removed from the
asylum state by [United States] governmental action, and therefore
establish a treaty violation, she or he may not object to trial in the
United States.
Id.
The political tensions between Canada and the United States ran high during
this period. Lewis, supra note 33, at 356; Kristofer R. Schleicher, Update, Transborder Abduction by American Bounty Hunters-The Jaffe Case and a New Understanding
between the United States and Canada, 20 GA.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 489, 497 (1990). To
placate Canada, former Secretary of State George M. Shultz attempted to get an
early parole for Jaffe. State Territory and TerritorialJurisdiction,78 AM. J. INT'L L. 207,
207-08 (1984). Secretary Shultz wrote in a letter to Florida authorities:
As no good reason appears the extradition treaty was not utilized to
secure Mr. Jaffe's return, it is perfectly understandable that the Government of Canada is outraged by his alleged kidnapping, which Canada considers a violation of the treaty and of international law, as well
as an affront to its sovereignty.
Id. at 208.
The United States extradited Jaffe's abductors to Canada, where they stood
trial for kidnapping. Schleicher, supra, at 497. Both abductors were convicted and
sentenced to twenty-one months in prison for the kidnapping. Id.
86 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
87 Id. at 2190, 2196-97.
88 Id. at 2191-92. The Chief Justice cited United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S.
407 (1886) and Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). Id.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, first discussed United States v. Rauscher s9 and distinguished Dr. AlvarezMachain's abduction from the facts of Rauscher.90 The Court
noted that, while Rauscher had been brought to the United
States through the use of a treaty and not through forcible abduction, Dr. Alvarez-Machain had been abducted without invocation of the treaty. 9 ' The majority next compared the AlvarezMachain case to Ker v. Illinois,92 noting that in Ker the government
was not involved in Ker's kidnapping and Peru did not object to
his abduction.9 3 The majority noted that Dr. Alvarez-Machain
contended that the United States government's involvement in
his kidnapping, against Mexico's objection, violated an implied
term of the treaty just as the abduction in Rauscher violated an
implied term of a treaty.9 4
The pivotal question in Alvarez-Machain, the Court asserted,
was whether the extradition treaty precluded unauthorized abductions of persons by the contracting nations. 9 5 The Chief Justice began by analyzing the terms of the treaty96 and pointed to
the absence of language prohibiting forcible abductions. 97
89 119 U.S. 407 (1886). See supra notes 49-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of Rauscher.
90 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2191-92.
91 Id. The Chief Justice quoted a passage from Rauscher, emphasizing that the
Court stressed that Rauscher did not come to the United States " 'by virtue of proceedings under an extradition treaty.' " Id. at 2191 (quoting Rauscher, 119 U.S. at
430). The Court also noted that the Rauscher Court had based its holding, in part,
on two federal statutes. Id.
92 Ker, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). See supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Ker.
93 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2193. The Court stated that the "only differences between Ker and the present case are that Ker was decided on the premise

that there was no governmental involvement in the abduction ...

and Peru ...

did

not object to his prosecution." Id. The Court also cited Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S.
519 (1952). Id. at 2192. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of Frisbie.
94 Id. at 2193. The Court also acknowledged the government's contention that
Rauscher was a narrow exception to the Ker rule which only applied when an extradition treaty was invoked. Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. (citing Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397 (1985); Valentine v. United
States ex. rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 11 (1936)). The Air France Court had declared
that "analysis [of a treaty] must begin ... with the text of the treaty and the context
in which the words are used." Air France, 470 U.S. at 397.
97 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2193. The Court stated that the "Treaty says
nothing about the obligations of the United States and Mexico to refrain from forcible abductions of people from the territory of the other nation, or the consequences under the Treaty if such an abduction occurs." Id. The Court rejected the
respondent's argument that a passage in the Treaty which stated that the treaty
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The Court next evaluated the respondent's argument that,
because the treaty gave the asylum nation the option to refuse to
extradite a defendant, the treaty was intended to encompass all
extraditions.98 The respondent also argued that any other interpretation would allow either government to kidnap the other
country's citizens without regard to the rights reserved in the
treaty, rendering the formation of treaties pointless.9 9 The Court
responded that, absent a treaty, there was no obligation to extradite a person.' 00 Therefore, the Court noted that nations formed
extradition treaties to create such an obligation and to provide a
mechanism for executing requested extraditions.' 0 ' Examining
the history of the treaty's negotiation and practice, the Court
2
found no evidence that abduction violated the treaty. 0
" 'shall apply to offenses specified in Article 2 [including murder] committed before
and after this Treaty enters into force,' " demonstrated an intent to make use of the
treaty compulsory for the crimes listed. Id. (quoting Extradition Treaty, May 4,
1978, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5059, 5073-74). The Court instead concluded that this
clause was included to allow extradition for crimes committed both before and after
the treaty was signed. Id.
98 Id. at 2193-94. Article 9 of the treaty provided:
1. Neither Contracting Party shall be bound to deliver up its own
nationals, but the executive authority of the requested Party shall, if
not prevented by the laws of that Party, have the power to deliver
them up if, in its discretion, it be deemed proper to do so.
2. If extradition is not granted pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, the requested Party shall submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, provided that Party has
jurisdiction over the offense.
Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5059, 5065.
99 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2194. The respondent had argued that the
United States, by entering into the treaty, had waived the option of self-help as a
means of gaining jurisdiction over a defendant, and that the contracting countries
could choose to either try defendants themselves or turn them over to a requesting
country. Id. at 2193-94. The Verdugo-Urquidez court had accepted this reasoning.
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1350 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating
that under the same treaty with Mexico, Mexico had two options: extradite or prosecute under its own authority), cert. granted andjudgment vacated by 112 S. Ct. 2188
(1992) (remanding to be decided in light of Alvarez-Machain). The dissent in Alvarez-Machain also adopted this logic. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2198 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
100 Id. at 2194.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 2194-95. The Court essentially reasoned that because the contracting
parties had not repudiated Ker in the treaty, the rule in Ker applied. Id. at 2194.
The majority also cited to a proposed clause for extradition written in 1935 by a
group of scholars which would have given the exact right for which Dr. AlvarezMachain argued. Id. at 2194 & n.13. This clause, however, was not included in the
Mexican-American extradition treaty. Id. at 2194-95. The majority also asserted
that the Mexican government was well aware of the Ker decision and therefore was
on notice of the United States position on extradition treaties. Id. at 2194. Sup-
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Finding no explicit prohibition against kidnapping in either
the treaty's express language or history, the Court considered the
respondent's assertion that Mexico's protest against the abduction evidenced a treaty violation. 0 3 The Court deemed this argument inconsistent with the rest of the respondent's arguments
and opined that if the extradition treaty had the force of law and
was self-executing, a court should enforce it irrespective of the
0 4
trespassed nation's protests.
The majority also criticized the respondent's argument that
international law should be implied into the treaty. ° 5 Although
the majority acknowledged that the Supreme Court previously
had implied international law into the Rauscher treaty, the Court
justified that implication on the existence of speciality 10 6 as solely
porting this claim, the Court cited a similar occurrence in 1905, when a Mexican
national was abducted and brought to the United States to stand trial. Id. at 2194
n. 11. Responding to a protest by the Mexican government, the Secretary of State
replied that the issue had been decided under Ker and that Mexico's remedy consisted of requesting the extradition of its citizen's kidnappers. Id. (citation
omitted).
103 Id. at 2195. The respondent argued that an objection was necessary because
an individual's rights were only derived from the contracting nation's rights under
the treaty. Id.
The Restatement of Foreign Relations suggests that if a nation from which a
defendant has been abducted does not object to the abduction, the abducting country may proceed against the defendant. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 432
cmt. c. See, e.g, United States v. Toro, 840 F.2d 1221, 1235 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating
that because neither nation objected to a kidnapping the court decided not to depart from the rule of trying unlawfully seized individuals); United States v. Cordero,
668 F.2d 32, 38 (1st Cir. 1981) (deciding that Venezuelan and Panamanian assistance in deportation evidenced no treaty violation); United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d
896, 902 (2d Cir. 1981) (asserting that absent protest by asylum nation, abducted
person has no standing to assert treaty violation); United States v. Valot, 625 F.2d
308, 310 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that Thai acquiescence to abduction proved no
treaty violation); Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203, 208 & n.9 (3d Cir. 1975) (declaring that "[t]he protections or rights which accrue to the extradited person primarily exist for the benefit of the asylum nation."); United States ex. rel. Lujan v.
Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 67 (2d Cir.) (stating that "the failure of Bolivia and Argentina to object to Lujan's abduction would seem to preclude any violation of international law which might otherwise have occurred"), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001
(1975).
104 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2195. The ChiefJustice noted that the Rauscher
Court did not appear to care whether England protested the defendant's trial for a
crime for which he had not been extradited. Id.
105 Id. The Court restated the respondent's argument that the treaty should be
interpreted in the context of international law and that "international abductions
are 'so clearly prohibited in international law' that there was no reason to include
such a clause in the Treaty itself." Id. (quoting Brief for Respondent at 11).
106 See supra note 55 and accompanying text for a discussion and explanation of
speciality.
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an extradition treaty concept. 10 7 The majority asserted that the
authorities cited by the respondent did not apply specifically to
extradition treaties but were general international law principles." °8 The Court rejected an interpretation of the treaty that
would imply terms preventing the United States from acquiring
jurisdiction over a Mexican national by any method other than
the treaty.' 09
While admitting Dr. Alvarez-Machain's abduction may have
been "shocking" and possibly violative of international law, the
Court refused to consider the abduction a treaty violation and
deferred to the executive branch's discretion."1° The Court
therefore ruled that, despite his abduction, Dr. Alvarez-Machain
could be tried for violations of United States law, and remanded
the case for further proceedings."'
In dissent," 2 Justice Stevens attacked the majority's reading
of the treaty and related precedent.' '3 The dissent distinguished
Dr. Alvarez-Machain's kidnapping from the kidnappings in Ker
and Frisbie, stating that the United States government, not a private citizen, violated the territorial integrity of Mexico by kidnapping Dr. Alvarez-Machain."14 The Justice advocated affirmance
107

Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2195-96.

108 Id. at 2196. The Court exaggerated the respondent's position by suggesting

that the respondent's argument would prohibit the United States from invading
Mexico. Id. This use of hyperbole may also have been geared toward rebutting the
dissent's assertion that the holding of the Court would permit United States agents
to torture or kill a suspect in Mexico. See id. at 2199 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
109 Id. at 2196. The Court characterized the implied term in Rauscher as a "small
step to take," but suggested that implying the respondent's requested term to the
Mexican-American treaty required "a much larger inferential leap, with only the
most general of international law principles to support it." Id.
110 Id. at 2196-97. As support for the advantages of executive resolution of the
matter, the Court cited the prohibition treaty involved in Cook v. United States. Id. at
2196 n.16 (citing Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933)). According to the
Chief Justice, it was an earlier decision by the Supreme Court that forced Britain
and the United States to form that treaty to settle differences over prohibition. Id.
11I Id. at 2197. On remand, United States District CourtJudge Edward Rafeedie
threw out the charges against Dr. Alvarez-Machain for lack of evidence. Seth
Mydans,Judge Clears Mexican in Agent's Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1992, at A20.
Judge Rafeedie was quoted as saying that "[t]here is suspicion and there may be
hunches, but there is no proof that he participated in the kidnapping of Camarena,
or that he even knew about it." Don DeBenedictis, Scant Evidence Frees Abducted Doctor, A.B.A.J., Feb. 1993, at 22.
112 Justice Stevens was joined in dissent by Justices O'Connor and Blackmun. Id.
at 2197 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
113 Id.
114 Id. The dissent characterized Ker as involving "an ordinary abduction by a
private kidnapper, or bounty hunter" and Frisbieas the "apprehension of an American fugitive who committed a crime in one state and sought asylum in another." Id.
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of the lower courts' rulings based on both Rauscher and international law. 15
The dissent closely analyzed the treaty's contents, noting
that it comprehensively covered every aspect of extradition." 6
Justice Stevens enumerated the excuses for withholding extradition that the treaty provided." 17 The Justice then declared that
the government's claim, that the treaty did not provide the only
means for bringing an individual to the United States, would
transform those excuses "into little more than verbiage."' 1
The Justice then attacked the Court's inference that, because
the treaty contained no provision disallowing abduction of the
other party's citizens, that activity was permissible.'
The dissent also criticized the Court's interpretation that the parties had
secretly reserved the option of self-help. 120 The Justice suggested that the majority's position could have been that the treaty
would allow the government's agents to torture or kill a national
within Mexico, because the treaty similarly did not prohibit those
activities. 12 ' The dissent rejected such an interpretation, assertId.
Id. at 2198 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens wrote:
From the preamble, through the description of the parties' obligations with respect to offenses committed within as well as beyond the
territory of a requesting party, the delineation of the procedures and
evidentiary requirements for extradition, the special provisions for
political offenses and capital punishment, and other details, the
Treaty appears to have been designed to cover the entire subject of
extradition.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
The dissent noted that in construing a treaty, a court should " 'give the specific
words of the treaty a meaning consistent with the shared expectations of the contracting parties.' " Id. at 2198 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Air France v.
Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 399 (1985)).
117 Id. at 2198 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent cited provisions which (1)
required "sufficient" evidence to grant extradition, (2) allowed a party to withhold
extradition when the statute of limitations for the crime had expired, (3) allowed a
party to withhold extradition when the alleged criminal had been tried for that
crime already, (4) allowed refusal of extradition when the party sought could face
the death penalty, and (5) allowed an asylum country to refuse extradition when the
offense was of a military or political nature. Id.
118 Id. The majority held that the treaty itself and the provisions within it provided the governments with a "mechanism which would not otherwise exist," and
which require, when certain conditions were met, the contracting governments to
turn over their own nationals. Id. at 2194.
119 Id. at 2199 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed out that the Rauscher
majority did not follow this logic with respect to implying the term of speciality into
the extradition treaty; rather, the dissent in Rauscher had followed this logic. Id. at
2199 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
120 Id. at 2199 & n.Il (Stevens, J., dissenting).
121 Id. at 2199 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115

116

1993]

NOTE

1151

ing that the treaty was built upon a mutual understanding between the countries 2that
each would respect the territorial
2
integrity of the other. 1

The dissent then analyzed the method by which the Rauscher
Court resolved the jurisdictional issue. 123 The Justice summarized that the Rauscher Court determined that the treaty completely covered the subject of extradition and its purpose was to
limit prosecution to crimes for which a person was extradited via
an extradition treaty. 124 From this analysis, the dissent concluded that an extradition treaty could limit the government's
ability to prosecute criminals despite a treaty's omission of cer25
tain provisions.

Turning to principles of international law, the dissent posited that, by entering into a treaty with another nation, a government was impliedly recognizing another nation's territorial
integrity. 12 6 Justice Stevens cited The Apollon ..as precedent in
122 Id. Justice Stevens also noted that both Mexico and Canada, the United
States' only bordering neighbors, considered their extradition treaties with the
United States to be the exclusive and comprehensive means of acquiring a person
from the other nation. Id. n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Brief for United
Mexican States as Amicus Curiae, at 6; Brief for Government of Canada as Amicus
Curiae, at 4).
123 Id. at 2200 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent also criticized the majority's
insinuation that the Rauscher Court's holding was based partly upon federal statutes. Id. at 2201 n. 18 (Stevens,J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argued that the statutes only protected the defendant before trial and did not decide jurisdictional
limits. Id. The Justice observed:
[Tihe Court suggests that the result in Rauscher was dictated by the
fact that two federal statutes had imposed the doctrine of specialty
upon extradition treaties. The two cited statutes, however, do not
contain any language purporting to limit the jurisdiction of the Court;
rather, they merely provide for protection of the accused pending
trial.
Id. at 2201 n.18 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
124 Id. at 2200 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Rauscher, 119
U.S. 407, 423 (1886)). The Justice asserted:
To interpret the [Rauscher] treaty in a contrary way would mean that a
country could request extradition of a person for one of the seven
crimes covered by the Treaty, and then to try the person for another
crime, such as a political crime, which was clearly not covered by the
Treaty; this result, the Court concluded, was clearly contrary to the
intent of the parties and the purpose of the Treaty.
Id. The dissent also quoted a passage from the Rauscher opinion that condemned
the government's position that, once a criminal was in a court of the United States,
it did not matter what offense he had been extradited for under the treaty. Id. at
2200-01 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
125 Id. at 2201 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
126 Id. The dissent cited to two landmark documents which the United States has
signed, The Charter of the United Nations and the Charter of the Organization of
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which the Court affirmed another country's territorial integrity. 12 8 In The Apollon, Justice Story condemned the American
seizure of a foreign ship in a Spanish port, characterizing the violation of international law as "monstrous." ' 129 The dissent also
cited two scholars who asserted that performing abductions
within another country's jurisdiction violated international
law. 130 The Justice opined that the doctrine of speciality, which
American States, to prove that international opinion generally denounced the violation of the territorial integrity of another nation. Id. at 2201 & n.20 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
The Charter of the United Nations, formulated in 1945, states that the United
Nations and its members
shall act in accordance with the following Principles.
1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members ....
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful
means in such a manner that international peace and security, and
justice, are not endangered.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations.
U.N.

CHARTER art. 2, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1037.
The O.A.S. Charter states in Article 17 as follows:
The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even
temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force
taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds
whatever. No territorial acquisitions or special advantages obtained
either by force or by other means of coercion shall be recognized.
O.A.S. CHARTER, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, at 2420, as amended by Protocol of
Buenos Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607.
127 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362 (1824).
128 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2201-02 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
129 The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 363, 371. In The Apollon, the Collector of
Customs had seized a ship in Spanish territory for alleged duty violations. Id.The
question was whether the statute, the Collection Act of 1799, permitted seizure
within the territory of another sovereign. Id. at 368, 369-70. The Apollon Court
decided that Congress would not intentionally violate international law in its
statute:
But, even supposing, for a moment, that our laws had required an
entry of the Apollon, in her transit, does it follow, that the power to
arrest her was meant to be given, after she had passed into the exclusive territory of a foreign nation? We think not. It would be monstrous to suppose that our revenue officers were authorized to enter
into foreign ports and territories, for the purpose of seizing vessels
which had offended against our laws. It cannot be presumed that Congress would voluntarily justify such a clear violation of the laws of
nations.
Id. at 370-71.
130 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.Ct. at 2202 & n.24 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (citing Op-
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the Rauscher Court had implied into a treaty, was less apparent
13 1
than the international repudiation of abductions by nations.
The dissent next contended that the majority neglected to
recognize the important distinction between the government's
involvement in Dr. Alvarez-Machain's abduction and the actions
of a private citizen in Ker. t3 2 To demonstrate this difference, the
Justice relied on Cook v. United States.1 33 The dissent recalled that
the Cook Court had rejected the government's argument that how
INTERNATIONAL LAw 295 & n.l (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955); Louis
Henkin, A Decent Respect for the Opinions of Mankind, 25J. MARSHALL L. REV. 215, 231
(1992)).
131 Id. The Justice cited to the RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 432, cmt.
c, as proof that governments generally condemn abductions by one nation within
another nation's territory. Id. at 2202 n.23 (Stevens,J., dissenting). Section 432 of
the RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS states in pertinent part:
(2) A state's law enforcement officers may exercise their functions in
the territory of another state only with the consent of the other state,
given by duly authorized officials of that state.
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 432(2). In the comments to this section,
the requirements under international law are stated for a violation of this principle:
If a state's law enforcement officials exercise their functions in the territory of another state without the latter's consent, that state is entitled to protest and, in appropriate cases, to receive reparation from
the offending state. If the unauthorized action includes abduction of
a person, the state from which the person was abducted may demand
return of the person, and international law requires that he be returned. If the state from which the person was abducted does not
demand his return, under the prevailing view the abducting state may
proceed to prosecute him under its laws.
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 432 cmt. c.
Writers on international law concur that abductions against the will of asylum
nations violate international law. See, Bassiouni, supra note 2, at 29 (arguing that
unlawful abduction "involves three distinct violations [of international law]: disruption of world public order; infringement of the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of another state; and violation of the human rights of the individual unlawfully
PENHEIM'S

seized");

SATYA

D.

BEDI,

EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE

21

(1966) (asserting that the abduction of a fugitive by one nation within the territory
of another nation "is prima facie a breach of international law for which the seizing
state is liable to the state of refuge"); 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 295 & n. 1
(H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955) (claiming that international law is breached when
one country kidnaps an individual within the territory of another country and "the
first duty of the offending State is to hand over the person in question to the State
in whose territory he was apprehended"); Lowenfeld, supra note 5, at 451 (maintaining that abductions by the United States within the territory of another nation
are a clear violation of international law); Henderson, supra note 26, at 544 (arguing
that, although drug smugglers appeared to be above the law, the "catch-andsnatch" policy violated international law).
132 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2203 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
133 Id. (citing Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933)). See supra notes 70-78
and accompanying text for an examination of Cook.
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a ship came into a court's jurisdiction was irrelevant.1 1 4 The dissent emphasized that the Cook Court had held that a court might
have jurisdiction over a boat seized by private citizens, but jurisdiction did not exist when the government seized a vessel in violation of a treaty which limited the government's authority to
seize.'3 5 The dissent also cited to Ker for the proposition that the
rules which applied to the actions of private citizens36did not exhaust the restrictions on the government's actions.
Although recognizing the government's desire to bring Dr.
Alvarez-Machain to justice for his alleged crime, Justice Stevens
13 7
asserted that the Court was bound to uphold the rule of law.
The Court's duty to uphold the law and set an example for other
nations, the dissent averred, should not bend to the will of the
8
executive.

3

As the Alvarez-Machain majority emphasized and the dissent
conceded, the general basis of the Ker-Frisbie rule is reasonable.
Justice would not be furthered if criminals were freed because of
their unlawful acquisition. The justification for the exclusionary
rule for evidence - deterrence of unconstitutional conduct in
law enforcement - is not sufficiently compelling to exclude the
defendant himself in most cases. Nevertheless, the Ker-Frisbie
134 Id. at 2204 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

Id.
Id. at 2204-05 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stressed that the arresting officer in Ker did not pretend to be acting in any official capacity when he
kidnaped Ker. As Justice Miller noted, "the facts show that it was a clear case of
kidnapping within the dominions of Peru, without any pretence of authority under
the treaty orfrom the government of the United States." Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. at 443.
The exact opposite is true in this case, as it was in Cook. Id. at 2204 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Ker, 119 U.S. at 443).
137 Id. at 2205 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
138 Id. at 2205-06 (Stevens, J., dissenting). As an example of the United States
Supreme Court's influence in the area, Justice Stevens cited to a recent case decided by South Africa's highest court. Id. at 2206 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing
State v. Ebrahim, 1991(2) S.A. 553, 582). Based on its understanding of United
States Supreme Court cases, including Ker, the South African court dismissed the
prosecution of a person kidnapped from another country. Id. The dismissal was
based on principles
that maintained and promoted human rights, good relations between
states and sound administration of justice: the individual had to be
protected against unlawful detention and against abduction, the limits
of territorial jurisdiction had to be respected, the fairness of the legal
process guaranteed and the abuse thereof prevented so as to protect
and promote the dignity and integrity of the judicial system. The
State was bound by these rules and had to come to court with clean
135
136

hands. .

.

. This requirement was not satisfied when the State was

involved in abduction across its borders.
Henkin, supra note 130, at 232 (citing Ebrahim, 1991(2) S.A. at 582).
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rule should not have been extended to allow jurisdiction over
those kidnapped in the territory of a treaty partner at governmental direction. Alvarez-Machain's extension of Ker-Frisbie not

only violated treaty interpretation principles such as good
faith, 139 respect for the sovereignty of a treaty partner and construction of treaties in harmony with international law,' 4 ° but it
also ignored sound precedent and policy.
Two distinct lines of cases, begotten on the same day over
one hundred years ago, finally came into their inevitable conflict
in Alvarez-Machain. Under the Ker v. Illinois 141 line of cases, a defendant may be tried despite the manner in which he came before
a court. Under United States v. Rauscher 142 and its progeny, a defendant may not be prosecuted if doing so would violate a treaty.
By reading the Mexican-American extradition treaty to allow selfhelp by the signatories, the Supreme Court permitted the Ker
principle to triumph. The Court's mistake was to look only to the
explicit words of the treaty to determine whether a treaty violation took place, rather than to the obvious intent of the parties
that the treaty would be the sole means 4143
of conveying alleged
4
criminals from one nation to the other.'
139 See, e.g., Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309, 321 (1907) (stating that "[w]hile
the escape of criminals is, of course, to be very greatly deprecated, it is still most
important that a treaty of this nature between sovereignties should be construed in
accordance with the highest good faith").
140 See supra note 126 for a discussion of international law and its implication on
treaties.
141 119 U.S. 436 (1886). See supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of the facts and holding of Ker.
142 119 U.S. 407 (1886). See supra notes 49-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of the facts and holding of Rauscher.
143 Nations sometimes agree to forego the procedures set out in an extradition
treaty resulting in "informal rendition." See Bassiouni, supra note 2, at 33. These
informal renditions usually occur between neighboring nations. Id. at 34. For example, the United States often receives informally rendered individuals from Mexico and Canada. Id. Informal renditions have been analogized to parties to a
contract assenting to utilize processes other than the ones set out in a contract. See,
e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1352 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that "treaties are in the nature of contracts between nations. Just as a private
party may waive a term in a contract that is in the contract for his benefit, so a
signatory to an extradition treaty may waive the requirement that the other signatory follow the procedures set forth in the treaty."), rev'd and remanded and judgment

vacated, 112 S. Ct. 2986 (1992).
144 Pursuant to Air France v. Saks, a court has the "responsibility to give the specific words of the treaty a meaning consistent with the shared expectations of the
contracting parties." 470 U.S. 392, 399 (1985) (citations omitted). In AlvarezMachain, Mexico submitted an amicus curiae brief to the Court, as did Canada, asserting that it understood the treaty to be the exclusive means by which their citizens
could be brought before a United States court. See Brief for the United Mexican
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The Court's logic in Alvarez-Machain is flawed, however, in
light of precedent such as United States v. Rauscher'4 5 andJohnson
v. Browne. 146 The Alvarez-Machain Court created a troubling inconsistency through its decision. The law now holds that a defendant brought to this country through an extradition treaty
with Mexico may be tried only for those crimes that the extradition treaty allows. For example, a defendant acquired through
the extradition treaty with Mexico may not be tried for political
crimes, for crimes for which he has already been tried, or for
crimes not specified to the Mexican government. Under the Alvarez-Machain decision, however, if the United States desires to try a
defendant for any of the aforementioned crimes, it may simply
ignore the treaty and utilize the "tool" of abduction. As one
writer has declared, this distinction between those defendants acquired by invocation of the treaty and those acquired by abduction "is not7 capable of rational justification and smacks of
4
sophistry."1

Had the Court applied a Rauscher analysis to Dr. AlvarezMachain's kidnapping, it would have found a violation of the extradition treaty because the United States had resorted to selfhelp and Mexico had repeatedly protested the violation of its territorial sovereignty. The remedy, as in Rauscher and Johnson,
would have been to return the individual to Mexico. Not only
would such a ruling have been consistent with the Rauscher line of
States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Granting Review at 2-3, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992); Brief for the Government of Canada as Amicus Curiae at 2-3, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992). The
United States, during the time period in which the current extradition treaty was
formed, also seemed to believe that extraterritorial abductions would be a violation
of international law. See Lowenfeld, supra note 5, at 482, 484-85. If a court is to
interpret treaties consistently with the expectations of the parties involved, and
both Mexico and the United States assumed kidnapping was precluded by international law, the Supreme Court should have interpreted it with such a meaning.
It might also be noted that at the turn of the century the Secretary of State
wrote to the Governor of Texas that:
The treaty of extradition between the United States and Mexico
prescribes the forms for carrying it into effect, and does not authorize
either party, for any cause, to deviate from those forms, or arbitrarily
abduct from the territory of one party a person charged with crime for
trial within the jurisdiction of the other.
4 MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw § 603 at 330 (1906).
145 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
146 205 U.S. 309 (1907). See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of the facts and holding of Johnson.
147 Lewis, supra note 33, at 348.
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precedent, to which the Court should have looked for guidance,
but it also would have served several important policy interests.
First, a ruling that a kidnapping in a treaty partner's territory
constitutes a treaty violation would have fulfilled the Court's duty
to interpret the treaty in harmony with principles of international
law and the shared expectations of the parties. In the past the
Supreme Court has faithfully guarded the rights of nations with
which the United States has contracted, often rejecting the government's arguments that an illegal proceeding was permissible
because the treaty did not expressly prohibit the action. 48 The
pact made with Mexico, and the more than one hundred other
nations that have formed extradition treaties with the United
States, 149 contains an orderly procedure for bringing a defendant
tojustice. The United States' blatant disregard for an instrument
that is built upon mutual trust and respect is unconscionable, as
was the Court's failure to interpret it in this light. Under international law, reparation is to be made for such a violation of territorial sovereignty. 150
Second, contrary to the Court's assertion that the need for a
protest by the nation whose territory is violated was inconsistent
with the rest of the respondent's argument, a protest should be
necessary to find a treaty violation. Because governments with
which the United States has extradition treaties sometimes hand
a defendant over to the United States through informal rendition,1 5 1 a protest evidences that a government
objects to the de52
fendant's trial in the United States.

Even considered from an enlightened self-interest perspective, the Alvarez-Machain decision and the current American
"catch-and-snatch" tactics are bad policy, because they endanger
United States citizens. 5 3 By reading extradition treaties to permit kidnapping by the signators, the Court has implicitly held
148 See United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886); see supra notes 49-61 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Rauscher; Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309
(1907); see supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text for an explanation of Johnson;
Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1973); see supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of Cook.
149 Abramovsky, supra note 4, at 154.
150 RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 432, cmt. c; see supra note 131 for
further discussion of the right to reparation.
151 See supra notes 10 and 143 for an explanation of informal rendition.
152 See supra note 103 for caselaw discussing such protests.
153 See, e.g., Iran Bill Allows Arrest of Americans Who Offend Nation, L.A. Times, Nov.
1, 1989, at A7, col. 4 (noting that in response to the Justice Department's opinion,
the Iranian Parliament passed a bill which would allow it to seize any American who
offends the nation of Iran, anywhere in the world.).
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that a nation may kidnap citizens of the United States within its
boundaries. Should such a violation of United States territorial
sovereignty occur, the Alvarez-Machain decision has destroyed the
credibility it would have had under world opinion and before the
United Nations, and will once again force the United States to
choose between inaction and brute force to free its abducted citizen. This is not a "new world order," but the law of the jungle.
As a result of the Alvarez-Machain decision, Mexico, one of
the United States' closest allies, is powerless to prevent further
violations of its sovereignty. The United States has refused to
honor Mexico's request for the extradition of Dr. AlvarezMachain's abductors to face kidnapping charges and has instead
paid them a sizable reward and brought their families to this
country.' 54 The United Nations is also an avenue of redress
seemingly closed to Mexico because the United States, a Security
Council member, has veto power over all resolutions
presented. 55 Although Mexico can give the United States the
"cold diplomatic shoulder," it is unlikely to do so, because of its
dependency upon American aid and cooperation. Thus, world
opinion and the desire to act in good faith are the only forces
preventing the United States from violating the territorial integrity of a treaty partner, and neither seems to be a sufficient
deterrent.
Not surprisingly, Mexico has demanded that the extradition
treaty be amended to prohibit any further abductions by the
United States. Whether the United States will amend the treaty
remains to be seen. There can be no doubt, however, that the
Alvarez-Machain decision informs every government that a treaty
with the United States will be construed to allow any action not
specifically prohibited. Nations can no longer trust the Supreme
154 See supra note 15 for facts regarding the treatment of Dr. Alvarez-Machain's
abductors.
155 An example of a case in which the United Nations Security Counsel took action over a kidnapping was its condemnation of the Israeli kidnapping of Adolf
Eichmann. Helen Silving, In re Eichman: A Dilemma of Law and ,11orality, 55 AMJ.
INT'L L. 307, 311-13 (1961). Eichman, a Nazi war criminal, had been living in Argentina under an assumed name when he was abducted by concentration camp survivors and brought to Israel to stand trial. Id. at 311-12. Upon Argentina's protest
to the United Nations Security Council, the Council recognized a violation of Argentina's sovereignty and the danger of such acts to international order and peace.
Id. at 312. The resolution proceeded to request that Israel make appropriate reparation within the U.N. Charter. Id. Argentina declined to exercise its right "as a
joint member of the United Nations," to demand Eichman's return. Lewis, supra
note 33, at 344. Instead, an agreement was reached in which Israel "formally apologized to Argentina and the latter expressed satisfaction." Id.

1993]

NOTE

1159

Court to hold the United States to the spirit of its obligations, but
only to their exact words.
David D. Almroth

